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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A. Nature of Case.

This case involves a boundary line dispute in Bonner County, Idaho. On April 19, 2010,
The Plaintiffs/Respondents Jean Coleman, Terri Boyd-Davis, and Brian Davis (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Coleman") pled ownership of a portion of the Appellant/Defendants
Tim and Carol Baker's property (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Baker") up to a fence
line based upon claims of adverse possession, boundary by acquiescence, and reformation of
Coleman's warranty deeds.
The following are depictions of the parcels and the "Disputed Property:"
Coleman
Property
Disputed
Property

Baker
Property

/I

(Ex. C, enhanced).
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Disputed
Property
Baker
Property

Parcel 1
Deed
/I

(A portion of Ex. C).
A four day bench trial was held from March 28, 2011 through March 31, 2011. The Court
concluded that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove both their adverse possession and boundary by
acquiescence claims, but nevertheless quieted title to a portion of the disputed property to
Coleman. In so doing, the Court took the unusual step of issuing two decisions. The Court first
issued a primary decision in which the Court concluded that the grantor intended to convey to
Coleman the disputed property up to the fence line despite the lack of any call within the deed to
the fence line. . The alternative decision issued by the Court is based on overlapping legal
descriptions in recorded deeds, and grants to Coleman a lesser amount of Baker's land.
The District Court's primary decision is clearly erroneous because the foundation of the
decision is the Court's finding of fact that the grantors intended to convey property up to a fence
line that did not exist when the grantor drafted and delivered the relevant deeds. Indeed, the
Court's findings of fact directly conflict, and undermine the basis for the Court's decision.
Specifically, the Court found that Harry Clark, through the Warranty Deed that was executed on
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December 23, 1970, intended to gift to Coleman property up to the fence line. (Tr., Court Trial,
p.1043 ). But, the Court also found that the fence line did not exist at the time that Harry Clark
drafted the Coleman Deed, because it wasn't constructed until 1971, (Tr., Court Trial, pp.1029,
1040-1041) after the property to the South (now Baker's property) was sold to Cliff and Joan
Johnson. The Court found that the grantee, Cliff Johnson, built the fence, not Harry Clark, and
there was no evidence admitted at trial to support any finding that Harry Clark knew where the
fence was going to be located, or participated in any manner with its construction. (Id.).
Therefore, it would have been impossible for the Clarks to have intended to convey up to a fence
line which did not exist at the time that the Clarks gifted the property to Coleman. Yet, that was
the basis for the Court's decision.
Furthermore, the District Court's decision abandons virtually all of the distance and the
bearing calls in the 1970 Coleman Warranty Deed, and results in a bizarrely shaped parcel of
property, which cannot be reconciled with the deed itself. In fact, it cannot be reconciled with
any deed of record in the case because all of the deeds describe the northerly and southerly
boundaries of all of the parcels at issue as running due east and west.

None describe a

meandering boundary on the North and South. Although it is undisputed that the 1970 Coleman
Deed is ambiguous as to the location of the point of true beginning, such afinding does not allow
the Court to draw new legal boundaries out of whole cloth, based upon a fence line which did not
exist at the time the property was conveyed. The Court cannot ignore all of the calls in the deed
simply to set out a more convenient description that cannot be reasonably reconciled with the
actual language in the deed itself. In a nutshell, the law does not permit the District Court to
wholly "re-imagine" the boundaries of a parcel of land under the guise of interpreting the deed.
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It appears the District Court itself recognized that its decision was flawed, as it issued an
"Alternative Decision," in which it quieted title in favor of Coleman to only a small portion of
the Disputed Property, based upon a finding that the legal descriptions in the competing deeds
overlap. The Court's interpretation in this alternative decision maintains most of the calls in the
deed and grants the overlap between the boundaries to Plaintiff Coleman on grounds that the
Coleman deed was recorded first. Unlike the flawed primary decision, this finding is not based
upon the location of a fence which did not exist at the time of the conveyance, and is supported
by the competent and substantial evidence admitted at trial. This Court should adopt the District
Court's Alternative Decision.

B. The Course of the Proceedings.
This case has an extensive post-trial procedural history. Coleman filed her Complaint on
April 19, 2010. (R., Vol. V, Bates 038-050). A four day bench trial was held from March 28,
2011 through March 31, 2011. During trial, the Court bifurcated the issue of ownership of the
Disputed Property from that of damages. Consequently, the trial dealt only with the ownership of
the Disputed Property. The damages phase of this case has yet to be tried.
The Court announced its trial decision in open court on April 28, 2011, (Tr., Court Trial,
p. 1020-1048) and issued an Order Determining Liability that same day R., Vol. V, Bates 08380840), which was amended on May 6, 2011 (R., Vol. V, 0841-0843). Through this decision, the
Court quieted title to the Respondent Coleman in the entirety of the Disputed Property.
Baker filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration on May 12, 2011 (R., Vol. V,
Bates 0844-0846), which was heard by the trial Court on July 6, 2011. (Tr. Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification, p. 1-36) The Court issued its Decision re: Bakers' Motion for
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Clarification and Reconsideration on September 2, 2011 (R., Vol. V, Bates 0875-0887), in which
the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, but ordered that Coleman conduct a
survey of the Disputed Property, and submit a legal description of the Disputed Property with a
proposed judgment.
On November 3, 2011, Coleman submitted a fax to the District Court which included her
proposed Judgment. (R., Vol. V. Bates 900-0911). Baker submitted their objection to the
proposed Judgment on November 15, 2011 (Id.), and supplemented the Objection on January 20,
2012. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 0958-0974). A hearing was held on April 18, 2012, at which time the
Court took the matter under advisement.
The District Court issued a Memorandum Decision re: Defendants' Objection to
Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment on July 13, 2012 (R. Vol. VI, Bates 1075-1084), in which it
reversed its decision, in part, by quieting title to Coleman in only a portion of the Disputed
Parcel. According to this decision, the title to the Disputed Property is quieted to the parties as
illustrated in the follow diagram:

Portion of Disputed
Property Quieted to
Baker

Also on July 13, 2012, the District Court filed its Memorandum Decision re: Remaining
Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1085-
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1100), in which it issued an "Alternative Decision," should its decision be overturned on appeal.
In the Court 's Alternative Decision, the Court found that the 1970 Coleman Deed (Ex. 3) and the
1971 Johnson Deed (Ex.7) overlap as to a small portion of the Disputed Property. (R., Vol. VI,
Bates 1085-1100). Because the Coleman Deed was recorded first, Coleman is the owner of the
portion of the Disputed Property over which the deeds overlap (hereinafter referred to as "the
Overlap"). (Id.) The Court also found that Coleman acquired the Overlap by adverse possession
through written instrument. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1085-1100). According to the District Court, if
this Court reverses the District Court's finding as to the then non-existent fence line being the
intent of the grantor, then only ownership of the Overlap is quieted to Coleman, with the
remainder quieted to Baker. (Id.)
The property quieted to Coleman under the Alternative Decision is depicted as follows:

Plamtiffs'
Trial Exhibit 23

(Id.)
On August 7, 2012, Respondent Terri Boyd-Davis submitted a letter to the Court asking
for reconsideration of the Court's findings. (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121 ). After further briefing
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by both parties, this matter was noticed for hearing which was held on October 17, 2012, at
which time the Court took the matter under advisement.
On September 13, 2012, the District Court issued a Partial Judgment Quieting Title in
Disputed Parcel of Real Property to Plaintiffs. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1200-1203) This Partial
Judgment quiets title in conformance with the Court's July 13, 2012, Memorandum Decision re:
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment (R., Vol. VI, Bates 1075-1084).
On November 29, 2012, the Court issued its Supplemental Decision re: Remaining
Liability Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and Order re: Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as a new Partial Judgment Quieting Title in Disputed Parcel
of Real Property to Plaintiffs. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1200-1203) Through this ruling, the Court
granted to the Plaintiffs an easement by implication and prescription over that portion of the
Disputed Property that was quieted to Baker. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1182-1199). The Court also
confirmed that Coleman had failed to prove her claim of boundary by agreement/acquiescence.
(Id.).

Appellant Baker filed a Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2012 (R., Vol. VII, Bates 11631181 ), and an Amended Notice of Appeal on January 9, 2013 (R, Vol. VII, Bates 1204-1223) ..
The Respondents filed their Notice of Cross Appeal on January 9, 2013, and Amended Notice of
Cross Appeal on January 15, 2013. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1226-1233).
C. Statement of Facts.

1.

Appellant/Defendants Baker own property located at 4430 Upper Pack River

Road, Sandpoint, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as "Baker Property"). (Tr., Court Trial p. 1021,
L.16-19).
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2.

Baker's property shares a common boundary to the north with property currently

owned by Respondent/Plaintiff Jean Coleman, Brian F. Davis and Terri Boyd-Davis (hereinafter
referred to as "the Coleman Property"). (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1021, L. 20-23).
3.

In the early l 960's, both the Baker Property and the Coleman Property were

owned by Harry and Edith Clark, who are the parents of Plaintiff/Respondent Jean Coleman.
4.

The Clarks gifted to Coleman the property she now owns through two warranty

deeds, the first of which was executed on October 17, 1966, for the Northern portion of the
Coleman property (hereinafter referred to as "the 1966 Coleman Deed"). (Ex. 2; Tr., Court Trial,
p.1022, L.7- 116).
5.

Four years later, the Clarks gifted to Coleman by Warranty Deed executed on

December 23rd, 1970, her southern parcel (hereinafter "the 1970 Coleman Deed"). (Ex. 3; Tr.,
Court Trial, p. 1022, L. 7- L.16).
6.

It is this Southern parcel that adjoins the Baker Property.

7.

At the time of these conveyances, Harry and Edith Clark owned the property both

to the South and to the West of the parcels gifted to Coleman. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 158, L. 15-20,
p. 1022, L. 21 ).
8.

Sometime in 1971, a blacksmith's cabin was moved onto the Coleman property by

Harry Clark. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L. 2-15, p. 1024, L. 15).
9.

On September 3, 1971, the Clarks sold that portion of the Baker Property that is

identified on the surveys as "Parcel 1" to Cliff and Joan Johnson, Appellant Baker's
predecessors-in-interest. (Ex. 7).
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10.

The Johnsons ultimately purchased three contiguous parcels of property from the

Clarks, as well as another parcel from an unrelated third party, but only the Johnsons'
Northernmost parcel borders property owned by Jean Coleman. (Ex. 6, 7, 8, 9; Tr., Court Trial
p.1023).
11.

The Court found that all of these deeds at issue in this case were drafted personally

by Harry Clark, who was not a trained surveyor. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1035).
12.

After acquiring Parcel 1 from the Clarks, Cliff Johnson constructed a wooden

fence on his property to contain his horses. (R., Vol. VII, Bates 1196; Tr., Court Trial, p. 1029).

13.

The fence, therefore, did not exist at the time that the Clarks conveyed the

property to Coleman.
14.

The fence does not run along either the boundary line of the property to the North,

or the boundary line between the property to the West, but meanders according to the topography
of the land. It does not follow any of the boundary lines of any of the properties in the area.

Parcell

(Ex. C).
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15.

Following Harry Clark's death in 1975, the Bank of Idaho was named as Trustee

for the Clark Estate.
16.

In 1976, Plaintiff Jean Coleman made a request to the Trustee for the conveyance

of additional property in lieu of a debt that she claimed was owed from the Trust to Coleman for
the payment of funeral expenses.
17.

The Trustee retained the services of Tucker Engineering Consultants to perform a

survey of the land owned by the Clark Estate, and the land which had been transferred from the
Clark Estate.
18.

Tucker Engineering recorded the "Survey for the Harry Clark Estates," dated July

3, 1979, under instrument number 223083 (hereinafter referred to as "the Clark Survey"). (Ex. I 7,
KKK).

19.

In doing so, the Tucker surveyors had difficulty surveying the Coleman deeds,

because they contain two conflicting calls. (Ex. 17).
20.

On the one hand, the 1966 Coleman Deed for Coleman's Northern parcel starts by

defining the point of true beginning by describing the following distance and bearing calls, but
also indicates that the Eastern boundary of the parcel is to proceed "200 feet Southeasterly along
the West boundary of Highway 130." (Ex. 3).
21.

However, when the distance calls are strictly followed, the Northwest corner of the

Northern Coleman property falls to the North of what was Highway 130 at the time, so that the
property line cannot proceed "200 feet Southeasterly along the West boundary of Highway 130."
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West Boundary of
What was Highway
130 in 1970

1966 Coleman
DeedDistance and
Bearing Call to
Place of Beginning

•

11

.i

l
I

(Ex. C, 16; Tr., Court Trial, p.49-50).
22.

The 1970 Coleman Deed simply builds off of the legal description in the 1966

Coleman Deed, and therefore contains the same conflict in calls. (Ex. 2, 3).
23.

As there is a conflict among the calls in the Coleman deeds, by operation of law

the call to the road trumps the distance and bearing calls. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v.
Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119, 794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) ("Monuments, natural

or artificial, or lines marked on ground, control over calls for courses and distances.")
24.

The Tucker surveyors made various attempts to deal with this ambiguity in the

Coleman Deeds, and their opinions are reflected in three surveys, which were admitted at trial,
including the following:
•

Plat of Survey, undated (Ex. 23)

•

Survey for Harry Clark Estate, dated July 3, 1979 (Ex. 13 ).

•

Survey for Jean Coleman, dated June 26, 1981 (Ex. 14).
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25.

All of these Tucker surveys portray a Southern boundary bearing due West, which

matches the bearing calls for the Southern boundaries in both Coleman deeds. (Ex. 13, 14, 23).
26.

The above referenced 1981 Tucker Survey was commissioned by Jean Coleman as

is evidenced by the Survey itself, which indicates it was "for Jean L. Coleman & Clark Estate,"
and by the testimony of attorney Michael Stewart, who confirmed that he was in communication
about the survey with Jean Coleman at the time it was being conducted. (Ex. 14; Tr., Court Trial,
pp. 702-708).
27.

Tucker Engineering also provided legal descriptions for the Coleman Property, the

Disputed Property, and the property directly to the West of the Coleman Property. (Ex. 21).
28.

Consequently, Coleman received actual and constructive notice at the time that

these Tucker surveys were completed and recorded that she did not own up the fence line; yet,
Coleman failed to take any action for 27 years to address what she now asserts are erroneous
surveys.
29.

The Bakers acquired the Johnsons' property by Warranty Deed executed and

recorded on June, 1, 2007, records of Bonner County, Idaho as instrument number 729995. (Ex.
10).

30.

Soon after the Bakers acquired their property, their neighbor to the South indicated

that he was the owner of a portion of the land that the Bakers had understood to be theirs.
31.

This caused the Bakers to contract with Glahe & Associates to survey the Bakers'

property.
32.

A survey was subsequently performed by surveyor David Evans of Glahe &

Associates, and the "Record of Survey for Tim Baker" dated November, 2007, was recorded in
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Bonner County under instrument number 741564 (hereinafter referred to as "the Baker Survey").
(Ex. 15; Ex. C).
33.

On June 11, 2009, Respondent/Plaintiff Jean Coleman transferred an undivided

interest in the Coleman Property to Respondent/Cross Appellant/Plaintiff Terri-Lynn Boyd Davis
and Respondent/Plaintiff Brian Davis by Quitclaim Deed executed and recorded on June 16,
2009, in the records of Bonner County under instrument number 774089. (Ex. 5).

II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED.

Is the Court's finding that the Clarks intended to convey to Coleman property up

to the fence line clearly erroneous, where the Court also concluded that the fence line did not
exist at the time of the conveyance?
2.

Did the Court err in determining the intent of the Grantor by relying upon

evidence of improvements made after conveyance and the use of the property by those that were
not the Grantors?
3.

Did the Court err in refusing to find that Coleman was barred under the doctrine

of laches from asserting her claims, after having been on notice for almost thirty years prior to
bringing her claims?

III.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review.
On appeal, the appellate Court will set aside findings of fact only upon a finding that they
are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P 52( a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited
to ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact and whether
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Crea v. Crea, 135 Idaho 246, 16 P.3d 922
(2000); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000).
In construing a deed of conveyance, the trial court's primary function is to seek and give
effect to the real intention of the parties. Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 770, 450 P.2d 990,
993 (1969); Hogan v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,251 P.2d 209,213 (1952); Phillips Industries,
Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-97, 827 P.2d 706, 709-10 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, if the

language of the deed is unambiguous, the parties' intent will be ascertained from the deed itself
as a matter of law, without resort to extrinsic evidence. Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 857,
673 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1983); Gardner, 92 Idaho at 770-71, 450 P.2d at 993-94. If, however, the
deed language is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of the grantor's intent becomes a
question of fact to be determined from the instrument itself and from all the surrounding facts
and circumstances. Latham, 105 Idaho at 857, 673 P.2d at 1051; Gardner, 92 Idaho at 771,450
P.2d at 994.
In this case, there is no dispute that the Coleman deed is ambiguous. (Tr., Court Trial, p.
1035). Thus, the District Court was tasked with determining the intent of the Grantors, Harry
and Edith Clark, at the time they conveyed the property to Jean Coleman, on December 23, 1970.
As discussed below, the Court's trial decision is clearly erroneous, because it is based upon a
finding that the Clark's intended to convey up to a fence that did not exist at the time of the
conveyance.
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B. The Court's Finding that the Clarks intended to Convey to Coleman all of the
Property up to the Fence Line is Clearly Erroneous where the Fence Did Not
Exist at the Time of the Conveyance.

Although Coleman asserted claims of adverse possess10n and boundary

by

agreement/acquiescence in her claim that she owns the real property extending to the fence line,
the Court rejected both claims, finding that she had failed to prove the elements of either claim
by clear and convincing evidence. Rather, the Court's decision was based solely upon a finding
that Harry and Edith Clark, the original grantors of both Plaintiffs and Defendant's properties,
intended in 1970 to convey to Jean Coleman land up to the fence line depicted on the 2007 Glahe
Survey. (Ex. C). Yet, the Court also found that Cliff Johnson built the fence in 1971. (Tr., Court
Trial, pp. 1040-1041 ).
Respectfully, Baker submits that the Clarks could not have intended to convey property
up to a fence line that did not exist at the time of the conveyance. Unless Harry Clark had reason
to know in 1970 that a fence line was going to be constructed, and also know the exact location
of where the fence would later be constructed, he could not have intended that the fence line
demarcate the Southern boundary of the Coleman property.
Moreover, the Court found that the fence line was subsequently built by Cliff Johnson,
not Harry Clark, and there was not a shred of evidence presented at trial indicating that Johnson
and Clark discussed the fence or its location. On the contrary, Cliff and Joan Johnson both
testified that the fence was built by Cliff Johnson after the Johnson acquired the property to
contain their horses, and no evidence as admitted at trial to indicate that Harry Clark was either
involved in the construction of the fence, or knew that it was being built. (Tr., p. 377, L. 6; Tr. P.
412, L. 1-2). Moreover, as the District Court recognized, Cliff Johnson testified at trial that the
fence was erected solely to contain his horses and the shape of the fence was never intended to
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mark a boundary and was located based upon the topography of the land. (R., Vol. VII, Bates
1195-1196). Unless the Clarks had the ability to see into the future, they could not have intended
to convey up to the fence line because they could not have known where it would be built.
Thus, the finding that the Clarks intended, by the deed executed in 1970, to convey property up
to the fence line is irreconcilable with the finding that Cliff Johnson built the fence after he
acquired the property in 1971. The Court's decision to quiet title up to the fence was, therefore,
clearly erroneous, and does not support its conclusion of law - that being that it was the Clarks'
intent to grant to Coleman property which was defined on its Southern boundary by the fence.
C. In Deciding that the Clarks Intended to Convey up to the Fence Line, The
District Court Erroneously Relied Upon Features which did not Exist at the
Time that the Clarks Conveyed the Property.
In ruling that the Clarks intended to convey to Coleman property up to the fence line, the
Court also based its finding that the Clarks' intended to convey the land up to the fence upon
certain features, other than the fence, which also did not exist at the time that the Clarks executed
the 1970 Coleman Deed. These include the existence of the cabin, the driveway leading to the
cabin, a clothes line, and the parking lot in front of the cabin. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1039). Jean
Coleman testified there were no buildings on the property when she first acquired it from her
parents, and that the cabin was moved within a year after the conveyance from the Clarks to her.
(Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L 2 - 7). From the pictures admitted at trial, it is clear that neither the
parking lot nor the driveway to the cabin, which now abuts the cabin itself, existed at the time of
the conveyance, and no evidence was admitted at trial that the Clarks were involved in any
manner with their construction.
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No driveway or parking
area yet constructed
between fence and cabin

Because these features did not exist at the time the Clarks drafted the deed to Coleman,
they cannot support a finding that the Clark' s intended to include these improvements in the
conveyance, unless there was some evidence that, at the time that the Clarks drafted the deed,
they knew these improvements would be made, and knew exactly where they would be located.
No such evidence was admitted at trial, because no such evidence exists. The Clarks could not
predict the future, and could not have intended to convey up to the non-existent fence line.
In fact, the shape of the fence itself contradicts any finding that it was intended to mark a
boundary line. All of the deeds drafted by Harry Clark that were admitted at trial contain
southern boundaries which run directly East/West. This includes six different deeds. (Ex. 2, 3, 6,
7, 8, 11 ). Yet, the fence does not run East/West, and in fact turns twice, is lies in a fish hook
pattern, which does not even remotely follow any of the boundaries described in the deeds for
any of the properties in this area.
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Parcel 1
Deed
/I

(Ex. C).

Thus, the location and bearing of the fence itself, as well as the direct testimony of Cliff
Johnson (Tr., Court Trial, p. 414, L. 11-14), demonstrates that it was not intended to mark a
boundary line.
The Court also erroneously relied upon the use of the Disputed Property by Jean Coleman
and her invitees in the years subsequent to the conveyance as evidence of the Clarks' intent. (Tr.,
Court Trial, pp.1038-1039). Specifically, the Court found that the parties "treated the fence line
as the boundary line." (Tr., Court Trial, p.1038). It is clear, however, that the District Court
conflated the concepts of boundary by acquiescence with what is required to be proven for a
finding of the grantor's intent. Jean Coleman's subsequent use of her property, and construction
of minor improvements thereon, may be probative of whether there was an agreement between
she and the Johnson's to treat the fence as a boundary line. However, this evidence is in no way
probative of what Harry and Edith Clark intended to convey on December 23, 1970.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRIEF- 22

In fact, despite the District Court's finding that the parties treated the fence as the
boundary line, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove the elements of boundary by
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence, because "acquiescence for a long period of time
does not necessarily tip the scales in favor of the encroaching party," particularly where there is
evidence on the record as to the manner and circumstances as to the creation of the fence. (R.,
Vol. VII, Bates l 191-1196)(quoting Huskinson v. Nelson, 152 Idaho 547,553,272 P.3d 519, 525
(2012). The use of the Disputed Property by Jean Coleman over the subsequent years since the
conveyance may be relevant to the boundary by acquiescence claim, but it is not relevant to the
determination of what the Clark's intended to convey when they drafted the 1970 Coleman
Deed. The focus must be on what the Clarks could have known at the time, not what Jean
Coleman has done in the forty years since she acquired the property.
While there was no evidence at trial indicating that the Clarks were involved with the
creation of the driveway to the cabin, or the parking lot, Jean Coleman did testify that Harry
Clark and a friend moved the cabin onto the Disputed Property. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 165, L. 2-15,
p. 1024, L. 15).
The District Court gave considerable weight to its finding that Harry Clark assisted in
the placement of the cabin on the Coleman property, and concluded that Harry Clark would not
have intentionally placed the cabin on the property line. Even if this is true, it lends no weight to
the finding that the Clarks intended to convey up to the fence line. There was no evidence
admitted at trial that the cabin's placement on the land had anything to do with the then
nonexistent fence line. At most, therefore, the cabin tends to prove that the Clarks intended to
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convey at least some of the property that they later conveyed to the Johnsons, but not that they
intended to convey up to a fence which was not in existence at the time of the conveyance.
These findings, therefore, do not support the Court's legal conclusion that Coleman is
entitled to quiet title in all of the property to the North of the fence.

D. The Court's Reliance on Surveyor Robert Stratton's Opinion is Clearly
Erroneous Where Stratton Admitted that he "Arbitrarily" Held the Southern
Boundary of the Location of the Fence, and Rotated the Entire Legal
Description by 23 Degrees.
In its findings of fact and law, the District Court also relied upon the testimony of
Coleman's expert witness surveyor, Robert Stratton. Mr. Stratton testified at trial that he had
created a number of different examples of how the legal descriptions in the Coleman and
Johnson Deeds can be interpreted, and those opinions are set forth in various diagrams that were
admitted at trial, and labeled by Mr. Stratton as Figures 1 through 8. (Ex.16). The Court found
that "figure 6 seems most consistent with the intent of the Clarks." (Tr., Court Trial, p. 1043.
This conclusion is clearly erroneous.
Mr. Stratton admitted at trial that he did not perform a formal survey of the boundaries of
either the Coleman or Baker properties.

Rather, he went to the property a single time on

November 30, 2010 with his father, and spent four hours performing what he described as a
"field survey," by which he documented the features that existed on the property in the winter of
2010, at a time when there was 12 inches of snow on the ground. (Ex. 16; Tr., Court Trial, pp.79
- 80, 85). Mr. Stratton then created various diagrams to match the existing features. (Ex.16).
These features, according to Mr. Stratton's testimony, included the Pack River Road (a/k/a
Highway No. 130), the fence, the cabin, the driveway and the parking lot. (Id.). Yet, with the
exception of Pack River Road, none of those features existed at the time that the Clarks conveyed
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the property to Jean Coleman. Thus, they could not have played any role in Harry Clark's
determination as to where to locate the property line. Moreover, Pack River Road washed out on
numerous occasions (Tr., Court Trial, pp. 112, 151, 258, 259, 312, 313, 741, 742, 800-801), and
has been widened, paved and realigned (Tr., Court Trial, pp.800-801, 871, L. 11-15) in the years
between 1970 when the Coleman deed was drafted, and 2010, when Stratton did his field survey.
Consequently, the road could not have been in the identical location in 2010, as it was in 1970.
In fact, Mr. Stratton admitted that the location of the road in 2010 was "definitely" different than
where it was located at the time the Clarks conveyed the property to Coleman. (Tr., Court Trial,
p. 97). Nevertheless, Stratton's Figure 6 is based upon his decision to "arbitrarily" locate the
edge of the Pack River Road 30 feet from its current center line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 55, L. 221 ). Stratton' s reliance upon features that exist in 2010, but did not exist in 1970, is, therefore,
clearly erroneous if the goal is to derive what was the intent of the grantor in 1970. That intent
must be derived solely from what the grantor knew at the time, or the grantor's subsequent
actions, not the actions of others, or improvements that were later constructed.
In fact, the best evidence of the Grantor's intent, and the only direct evidence admitted at
trial, are the Coleman Deeds themselves, which were drafted by Harry Clark personally. (Tr.,
Court Trial, p. 80, L. 15-21). They contain his statements as to what the Clarks intended to gift
to Jean Coleman. Because these are the only statements made directly by the Clarks that are in
the record, any analysis of the intent of the Clarks must start with these deeds. While extrinsic
evidence can be considered to resolve an ambiguity in the deeds, such evidence cannot
completely supplant the deeds themselves. City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
4th 232, 238, 914 P.2d 160, 164 (1996) ("Extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the
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instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which it is not susceptible, and it is the
instrument itself that must be given effect. "). Yet, Stratton' s opinion, as set forth in Figure 6

(Ex. 16), ignores numerous calls in these deeds, most strikingly the calls that define Coleman' s
Southern boundary.
The 1970 Coleman Deed defines the Southern boundary line of the Coleman Property as
"225 feet West" from the "Boundary of Highway 130," which is known currently as Pack River
Road. (Ex. F). Nothing in this deed calls to a fence line. This is logical, as the fence did not
exist at the time that the deed was drafted. The call of "225 feet West" is maintained in all of the
surveys performed by the Tucker Engineering surveyors which were performed in the late
1970' s and early 1980' s, as well as the survey performed by David Evans of Glahe & Associates,
in 2007. (Ex. 13, 14, 15, & 23):

Tucker 1981 Survey
Tucker 1979 Survey

Tucker Unrecorded Survev- P's Ex. Z3

(Ex. 13, 14, 15).
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· Glahe 2007 Survey

Even Coleman's expert, Mr. Stratton, maintained this bearing call for the Southern
Boundary in all but one of his interpretations of the deeds:

Stratton Figure 6
Stratton Figure 4

Stratton Figure 5

Stratton Figure 8
Stratton Figure 7

(Ex.16).
In Figure 6, however, Mr. Stratton did not depict the Southern Boundary as extending
225 feet West, as is stated in the Deed, but instead depicts the Southern boundary as bearing
Southwest. (Ex.16). When asked at trial to explain this departure from the bearing call in the
1970 Coleman Deed, Mr. Stratton admitted that in order to reach Figure 6, he had to, in his
words, "arbitrarily" rotate the entire legal description 23 degrees counterclockwise, so that the
Southern Boundary would fall "roughly" along the fence line. (Tr., Trial Court, pp. 107-108).
Nothing in the deed itself calls for such a rotation. Rather, the fence line itself is the only
justification for such a drastic departure from the language of the deed itself. However, because
we know that the fence did not exist at the time Harry Clark drafted the Coleman deed, Harry
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Clark simply could not have intended that the entire legal description be rotated to match a nonexistent fence. Stratton's conclusion assumes that Harry Clark could have known where the
fence would be located, and is, therefore, clearly erroneous.
Moreover, when converted to an actual survey, rather than a theoretical diagram,
Stratton's Figure 6 results in a legal description which abandons nearly every distance and
bearing call in the deeds that were actually drafted by Harry Clark.

(R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121, 1129-1132; R. Vol. VII., Bates 1200-1203).
The relevant language in the 1970 Coleman Deed reads:
[From] the true point of beginning; thence 450 feet Southeasterly
along the West Boundary of Highway No. 130; thence 225 feet
West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West of said
Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of beginning.
(Ex. F).
A direct comparison of the deed itself with the Stratton survey and the legal description
contained in the Partial Judgment reveals that Stratton's interpretation of Harry Clark's intent
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ignores virtually every call in the deeds drafted by Harry Clark, in favor of arbitrarily rotating the
legal description to fit the Plaintiff's desired outcome - ownership of the property up to the fence
line:
Lamma!!e in 1970 Ouitclaim Deed

Disouted Parcel oer Partial Jud!!ment

Thence 450 feet Southeasterly along
West boundary of Highway No. 130,
Thence 225 feet West

Thence 4 71.4 7 feet Southeasterly along the West
boundary of the new Pack River Road,
Thence 225 feet traveling Southwesterly at
N66°52'49"E
Thence and undisclosed distance Northwesterly
traveling at N37°01 '01 "W
Thence East approximately 95 feet
Thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West Thence approximately 350 feet Northwesterly
of said Highway
traveling at N42°54'03"W
Thence 130 feet East to the true point of Thence East along a curve a distance of
beginning
approximately 82.95 feet

(Ex. F; R., Vol. VI, Bates 1115-1121, 1129-1132; R. Vol. VII., Bates 1200-1203).
While the Coleman Deeds are admittedly ambiguous because the distance and bearing call
to the point of true beginning conflicts with the call to the boundary of the highway, this does not
justify the complete abandonment of nearly every call in the deed. Any interpretation of the
deeds must give effect to as many of the calls in the deeds as is reasonably possible. Sun Valley

Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description,
effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description."). It is
simply not reasonable to find that the deed contains an implied call to a fence line, when no such
call is indicated, and the fence did not exist at the time of the conveyance. The District Court's
findings in this regard are therefore, clearly erroneous.
In fact, if Mr. Stratton is to be believed, then Harry Clark was unable to tell the difference
between West and Southwest, to the effect that when he included "West" in the 1970 Coleman
Deed, he meant 23 degrees to the Southwest. However, the 1970 Coleman Deed is not the only
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deed that was drafted by Harry Clark. Five other Deeds were also drafted by Clark. Four of
these deeds define their respective Southern boundaries by a call to due West (Ex. 2, 6, 7, 8).
The logical extent of Mr. Stratton's theory would require that all of parcels for which Harry
Clark drafted the deeds would need to be rotated 23 degrees counterclockwise, down to the
section line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 123).

Deeds Drafted by Harry Clark which
contain call to "West" as Southern
Boundary

Yet, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Harry Clark was unable to
read a compass to determine that West was not Southwest, and the resulting confusion that
would result from rotating all of these parcels by 23 degrees is further evidence of the erroneous
nature of Mr. Stratton's opinion.
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E. The Partial Judgment Results in Such an Oddly Shaped Parcel as to Demonstrate

that the District Court's Decision is Clearly Erroneous.
At trial, the District Court considered evidence from three surveyors: (1) Tucker
Engineering, from which three historical surveys were admitted into evidence; (2) Robert
Stratton, the Plaintiffs expert witness; and (3) David Evans, the Defendant's expert witness.
Although the interpretations by the three surveyors conflict as to certain distance and bearing
calls, they were generally consistent with regard to the shape of the 1970 Coleman parcel - in
that the Coleman parcel is a quadrilateral, or a quadrilateral with a slight curve.

Tucker 1981 Survey
Tucker 1979 Survey

Tucker Unrecorded Survey- P's Ex. 23

· Glahe Z007 Survey

These interpretations as to the shape of the Coleman parcel comport with the legal
description of the 1970 Coleman Deed, as drafted by Harry Clark, which states, in relevant part:
[From] the true point of beginning; thence 450 feet Southeasterly
along the West Boundary of Highway No. 130; thence 225 feet
West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet West of said
Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of beginning.
(Ex. F).
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From this description, it is clear that Harry Clark intended the parcel be a simple
quadrilateral, with four comers, with the Eastern boundary running along the highway. This has
been confirmed by the Plaintiffs' expert, Robert Stratton (Ex. 16), who provided at trial many
interpretations of the Coleman deeds, all of which demonstrate clearly that the legal description
drafted by Harry Clark in the 1970 deed conveys a four cornered quadrangle:

Stratton Figure 6
Stratton Figure 4

Stratton Figure 5

Stratton Figure 8
Stratton Figure 7

Even in Stratton's Figure 6, in which Stratton rotates the legal description by more than 23
degrees in order to fit the fence line (Ex. 16), Stratton' s interpretation of the shape of the
Coleman parcels is a simple four cornered quadrilateral. The difference in this interpretation is
that it is rotated counter-clockwise to match a fence line that did exist at the time the deed was
drafted. It does not, however, drastically change the shape of the property so described.
The shape of the parcel that the District Court detennined was gifted by the Clarks to Jean
Coleman, however, is not a quadrilateral, but is the following bizarre shape:
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The District Court's decision is based upon a finding that Harry Clark intended to convey
this parcel of property to Jean Coleman. Yet, absolutely nothing in the language of the Coleman

Deeds gives any indication that such an oddly shaped property was being conveyed, and no
evidence at trial was admitted which supports a finding that Harry Clark intended to convey a
property of this shape.
While it was undisputed that the Coleman Deeds contain ambiguous legal descriptions,
this finding does not allow the District Court to completely ignore the language of the
deeds, and draw from whole cloth an entirely new and factually unsupported boundary
line. The best evidence as to what Harry Clark intended to convey to Jean Coleman continues to

be the legal descriptions that he drafted. Although there are discrepancies, this does not justify
the District Court ignoring virtually all of the distance and bearing calls in the deeds, and
creating a parcel which is completely contrary to the parcel described in the deed. Sun Valley
Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description,

effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description.").
Stratton's opinion as reflected by his Figure 6 cannot reflect the intent of the Clark's.
Rather, it reflects the desires of Coleman to own up to the fence line, and is based upon
"features" that did not exist at the time that the Clark's conveyed their property to Coleman. The
Court's reliance upon this particular opinion of Stratton, therefore, is clearly erroneous, and does
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not support its conclusion of law - being that Coleman owns the Disputed Portion up to the fence
line.

F. The Court's "Alternative Decision" is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
In response to Appellant Baker's motion for reconsiderations and objections to the
proposed judgment, the District Court appears to have recognized the issues described above,
and took the unorthodox approach of issuing an "Alternative Decision," that "would be effective
only if the earlier decision was reversed on appeal." (R., Vol. VI, p. 1086). Unlike the District
Court's earlier decision, this Alternative Decision is not based upon a finding that the Clarks
intended to convey up to a fence that did not exist, and is supported by substantial evidence.
In both its original decision and it its Alternative Decision, the District Court correctly
found that the call to the point of true beginning in the Coleman deeds conflicts with the call to
the Western Boundary of Highway 130. This does not, however, require a finding that the
Clark's intended to convey to a fence line which did not exist. The proper resolution to this issue
was set forth as far back as the late 1970's, by the original surveyor, Tucker Engineering, in its
undated Plat of Survey which was admitted at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23).
Recognizing that the call to the highway trumps the distance and bearing calls to the
point of true beginning, the Tucker surveyors were required to shift the legal description South
so that the Eastern boundary of the Coleman property runs along the edge of Highway 130, a/k/a
Pack River Road. Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393
("Monuments, natural or artificial, or lines marked on ground, control over calls for courses and
distances."). Doing this allows the Coleman Deed to fit to the road, while maintaining all of the
remaining calls in the 1970 Coleman Deed. The result is an overlap of the legal descriptions in
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the 1970 Coleman Deed (Ex. 3), and the Warranty Deed by which the Clarks conveyed Parcel 1
to the Johnsons in 1971 (Ex. 7). This overlap was depicted by Tucker Engineering on Plaintiffs
Exhibit 23:

Overlap

,·

(Ex. 23).
Because the Southern Coleman Deed was executed and recorded in 1970 (Ex. 3), whereas
the Johnson Deed was executed in 1971(Ex. 7), the Coleman Deed is senior to the Johnson Deed.
To the extent there is an overlap, therefore, the Coleman Deed prevails. Sun Valley Land &

Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 867, 853 P.2d 607, 612 (Ct. App. 1993) (The instrument
first recorded takes precedence.) Because the Clarks had already conveyed the property to
Coleman in 1970, inclusive of the area which is indicated above as the "overlap," the subsequent
conveyance of this same property to the Johnson's was ineffective. As the District Court put it,
"you can't give away what you don't have." (Tr. Court Trial, p.1042). However, this is limited
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to that portion of the Johnson Property which is also legally described in the 1970 Coleman Deed
- i.e. the area of "overlap," as depicted on Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23).
The District Court reasoned that when Harry Clark assisted in placing a cabin on the
property in 1971, he would not have placed the cabin on what he believed to be the boundary
line. (Tr., Court Trial, p. 103 8). The point is well taken, but it does not necessarily follow that
Harry Clark intended to convey all the way up to the fence line, which, as the District Court
concluded, had not yet been built. Rather, the more logical explanation is that in drafting the
Coleman and Johnson deeds, Harry Clark mistakenly included an overlap, which is depicted in
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23).
The strongest evidence to support this interpretation of the deeds is the language of the
deeds themselves, which is the only true evidence on the record coming directly from Harry
Clark regarding his intent. The 1970 Quitclaim Deed drafted by Harry Clark describes the
Southern Coleman parcel as follows:
. . . [FromJ the true point of beginning; Thence 450 feet
Southeasterly along the West boundary of Highway No. 130;
thence 225 feet West; thence Northwesterly to a point 130 feet
West of said Highway; thence 130 feet East to the true point of
beginning.
(Ex. F) (emphasis added).
Each of the calls in the 1970 Coleman Deed that are emphasized are maintained in the
unrecorded Tucker survey (Ex. 23), and abandoned in the Court's Partial Judgment. (R., Vol.
VII, Bates 1200-1203).
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Stratton Survey

Tucker Survey- P's Exh. 23

•

Call Along Pack River Road: The distance of 450 feet along Pack River Road is

accurately shown in the Tucker Survey Plaintiff's Exhibit 23; whereas, the
Stratton survey depicts this distance to be about 471.4 7. (Ex. 16; 23; R. Vol. VI,
p. 1200-1203)
•

Southern Boundarv: The call of the Southern boundary as 225 West is also

maintained in the unrecorded Tucker survey, while the Stratton survey rotates this
line by 23 degrees counterclockwise, resulting in a parcel of far greater size than
is described in the deed. (Id.).

•

Eastern Boundary: The Clark deed then calls for the eastern line to extend

"Northwesterly, to a point 130 feet West" of Pack River Road.

Again, this

matches what is depicted in the Tucker survey. Yet, in the Stratton Survey, the
Eastern Boundary extends Northwesterly an undisclosed number of feet, to a
point which is more than 268.48 feet from the Pack River road, then travels
directly

East

approximately
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92. 79

feet,

then

travels

Northwest

more

approximately 350 feet. The Clark Deed contains no indication whatsoever that
Clark was intending to convey property of these dimensions or distances. (Id.).
The Tucker Survey, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 23 provides the only reasonable means to reconcile
the calls in the deed with the placement of the cabin by Harry Clark and his friend, as the cabin
sits well within the overlap depicted in Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23). If Exhibit 23 was Harry
Clark's intent, this would explain the placement of the cabin, and results in the entire cabin being
located within the Coleman Property.
Additionally, the Plaintiff's surveyor, Robert Stratton, submitted an interpretation of the
deeds which matches the Tucker Survey admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 23 - his Figure 8, which
is depicted as follows:
NOTE:
:HIS DRAl\1NG SHOWS THE
CO~EMAN DEEDS SUFERIMPCS[D
OVcR THE PHYSICAL FEATURES
AND LETTI~G !He W.ST LINE Or
PARCEi. CIA FLOAT. DIMENSIONS
THA i I/ARY FROM DEED ARE
SHOWN.

(Ex. 16).
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While Stratton preferred his Figure 6, which by Stratton's own admission required that he
arbitrarily hold the Southern boundary line along the not yet built fence line, he also indicated in
his report that this Figure 8 was "a reasonable alternative based on the deeds." (Ex. 16). The
Bakers respectfully submit that this is the only reasonable interpretation, as it holds nearly all of
the calls in the deed, while reconciling Harry Clark's placement of the cabin. Sun Valley
Shamrock Res., Inc., 118 Idaho at 120, 794 P.2d at 1393 ("When construing a deed description,

effect must be given, if possible, to all of the language contained in the description.").
Other than the placement of the Cabin, there is no other competent evidence that would
support a finding that Clark intended to convey the property described in the Partial Judgment.
The driveway to the cabin did not exist at the time of the conveyance, because the cabin had not
yet been placed on the property. (Tr., Court Trial, pp.411, 412). The same is true for the parking
area, and the fence had not yet been built by Clifford Johnson, who would not purchase his
property until the year following the receipt of the property by Coleman. Consequently, the only
reasonable interpretation of the evidence is depicted in the Plaintiffs Exhibit 23. (Ex. 23).
G. The Court's Partial Judgment Results in a Reformation of the Deed Without the
Requisite Finding of Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
Although the District Court framed its original decision on a finding of the intent of
Harry and Edith Clark, the result was a complete reformation of the 1970 Coleman Deed to
match the fence line that was constructed in 1971. Essentially, Coleman was asking the Court to
find that the Clarks' intended to grant up to the fence line, but mistakenly left out the call to the
fence in the Deed. By ruling that the Clarks intended to grant up to the fence line, the Court
effectively reformed the 1970 Coleman Deed to include a call to the fence line.
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Yet, the Court reached this decision by only a preponderance of the evidence.
Reformation of a deed, however, requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.
In interpreting a deed, the court's goal is to carry out the real
intention of the parties. C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766,
25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). If an instrument does not reflect the true
intent of the parties due to mutual mistake, then reformation of that
instrument may be the proper remedy. Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91
Idaho 69, 72-73, 415 P.2d 712, 715-16 (1966). "A mutual mistake
occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon
which the bargain is based." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853,
934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). The court acts properly in reforming the
instrument to reflect the agreement the parties would have made
but for the mistake. Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 640-41, 671
P.2d 1099, 1103-04 (Ct.App.1983). What the parties actually
intended is a question of fact. Id. at 641, 671 P.2d at 1104. The
party alleging the mutual mistake has the burden of proving it
by clear and convincing evidence. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho
294,296,527 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1974).
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006) (emphasis added).

In its original decision, the Court made no findings that the Plaintiff had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the Clark's mistakenly left out the call to the fence line in the 1970
Coleman Deed. The Court's ruling, therefore, is clearly erroneous, and must be overturned.
The Court's Alterative Decision, however, does not require reformation of the deed. It
only requires a finding that the 1970 Coleman Deed describes property which overlaps with the
property conveyed to the Johnsons in 1971. It does not require the Court to reform the deed to
include a call to a fence line which was not included in the language of the deed itself. Thus, the
Court's Alterative Decision applies the correct standard of proof.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRIEF - 40

H. The District Court Erroneously Failed to Consider the Baker's Defense of Laches.

Baker asserted an affirmative defense of !aches in their Amended Answer, and argued
this defense at trial.

The Court, however, did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of

law with respect to this affirmative defense. The Bakers requested that the Court consider the
defense in reconsidering its opinion.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Jean Coleman was aware of the issues with
respect to the legal descriptions for her properties no later than 1981. Tucker Engineering
provided such notification by letter dated October 12, 1979. (Ex. HH). A survey was completed
for Jean Coleman, as evidenced by the 1981 Tucker Survey, which is labeled "for Jean
Coleman." (Ex. B). Evidence was admitted at trial that Ms. Coleman was part of this process,
and asked to be present during the Jean Coleman survey. (Ex. X; Tr. Court Trial, p. 701- 708).
New legal descriptions were drafted in 1981 for Coleman by Tucker Engineering, which directly
addressed the ambiguities in the deeds. (Ex. 21 ).
Yet, Coleman chose not to address these issues until almost 30 years later, when
witnesses are no longer available, evidence is lost, and memories have faded. The loss of such
evidence particularly the Court's finding that Cliff Johnson's memory is not reliable (Tr., Court
Trial, pp. I 029-1030)) has caused substantial prejudice to the Bakers.
Circumstances such as these are exactly why the doctrine of !aches exists, and Baker
requested that that the Court make particularized findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding this defense. (R., Vol. V, pp. 0856-0857). In ruling on Baker's Motion for
Reconsideration, the District Court identified the elements of !aches as follows:
To invoke the defense of !aches, Idaho requires the following
elements to be proven: ( 1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights,
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(2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, the plaintiff having had
notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of knowledge
by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or
prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the
suit is not held to be barred. Lapse of time, although an important
element, is not alone controlling in determining the applicability of
the defense of laches, unless the party claiming laches was injured
or placed at a disadvantage by such delay.
Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252,259, 706 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Huppert
v. Wo(ford, 91 Idaho 249,257,420 P.2d 11, 19 (1966)).

The District Court went on to rule:
The Bakers invaded Jean Coleman's rights when they tore do'Wll a portion of the fence. There
was no material delay by the plaintiffs in asserting their rights. Accordingly, the Bakers did not
prove the defense of laches.

(R., Vol. V., Bates 0886).
This analysis is clearly erroneous. Jean Coleman invaded the rights of the Johnsons (the
Bakers' predecessor's-in-interest) by knowingly utilizing a portion of the Johnsons' property
which she did not own. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Ms. Coleman knew about the
problematic legal descriptions by 1981. By waiting almost 30 years to assert a claim to the
property, she allowed the evidence to grow stale. The Court erred by failing to consider this
defense from the standpoint of the Bakers, rather than the standpoint of Coleman, and by failing
to make particularized findings of fact as to whether Ms. Coleman was, in fact, aware of these
issues, and whether her delay in bringing the claim materially prejudiced the Appellants.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Bakers respectfully submit that the decision of the District
Court is clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial evidence. Consequently, the Bakers
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request that the Supreme Court reverse that decision and either adopt the Court's Alternative
Decision, or remand with instructions to the District Court to make a determination of the
Grantor's intent based only upon evidence that the Clarks could have considered when drafting
the deeds by which they conveyed the property to Coleman.

") ,.,_,;

DATED this 'X 0

day of November, 2013.
BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD.

cu~
ANDRA NELSON
Attorneys for Appellants Baker

APPELLANT'S APPEAL BRIEF - 43

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On N ovember~O 13, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the
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Terri Boyd-Davis
12738 N. Strahorn Rd.
Hayden, ID 83835
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Brian F. Davis
12738 N. Strahorn Rd.
Hayden, ID 83835
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Jean L. Coleman
2902 N. 5th Ave.,
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Plaintiff
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